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EVIDENCE
I. CONSPIRACY TO IMPORT MARIUANA IS A CRIME OF
MORAL TURPITUDE
In Green v. Hewett1 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
conspiracy to import marijuana is a crime of moral turpitude.2 There-
fore, a witness's prior conviction for this crime is admissible at trial to
impeach his credibility. 3 The Green decision places South Carolina
among a minority of states that have classified conspiracy to import
marijuana as a crime of moral turpitude.
The appellant, Gladys M. Green, sued the respondent, Trubie Elbie
Hewett, for damages arising from an automobile accident. At trial
Hewett filed a motion in limine to prohibit Green from using Hewett's
prior conviction for conspiracy to import marijuana to impeach his
credibility.4 The trial judge granted the motion and prohibited the
appellant from questioning Hewett about his criminal record. The jury
subsequently returned a verdict for Hewett, and Green appealed.5
On appeal, the supreme court held that the trial judge erred in
failing to allow Green to impeach Hewett's credibility with the prior
conviction. The court defined a crime of moral turpitude as one involving
an act "of baseness, vileness, or depravity in private and social duties
which man owes to his fellow man or to society in general, contrary to
the customary and accepted rule of right and duty between man and
man." 6 The determination of whether a particular crime involves moral
turpitude should focus primarily on the societal duties that the criminal
breached in committing the particular crime.7 Accordingly, because the
Green court recognized that the importation of large quantities of drugs
"undoubtedly contributes to the destruction of ordered society," the court
1. 305 S.C. 238, 407 S.E.2d 651 (1991).
2. Id. at 238-39, 407 S.E.2d at 651.
3. Id. at 242, 407 S.E.2d at 653.
4. Hewett was convicted in 1983 for conspiring to import 27,000 to 32,000
pounds of marijuana into the United States. Id. at 239, 407 S.E.2d at 652.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 240, 407 S.E.2d at 652 (citing State v. Ball, 292 S.C. 71, 354 S.E.2d
906 (1987), overruled by State v. Major, 302 S.C. 181, 391 S.E.2d 235 (1990)).
Although Major overruled Ball, the court retained the Ball test for determining
whether a crime involves moral turpitude. Green, 305 S.C. at 241 n.2, 407 S.E.2d
at 652 n.2.
7. Green, 305 S.C. at 241, 407 S.E.2d at 652 (citing Ball, 292 S.C. 71, 354
S.E.2d 906).
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concluded that conspiracy to import marijuana is a crime of moral
turpitude!
The supreme court broke relatively new ground with the Green
decision. Apparently, only two other states have held that conspiracy to
import marijuana is a crime of moral turpitude.9 However, some states
have held that "[i]f the actual commission of an offense involves moral
turpitude, then a conspiracy to commit such offense would involve moral
turpitude." 10 The court's reasoning in Green is also consistent with
other states which have held that, although mere possession of marijuana
is not a crime of moral turpitude," possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute does involve moral turpitude.1
A recent decision by the South Carolina Court of Appeals, State v.
Hall, 13 appears to conflict with the Green court's reasoning. In Hall the
court of appeals held that a first offense for driving under the influence
is not a crime of moral turpitude.14 Under the Green court's reasoning,
however, driving under the influence should be a crime of moral
turpitude because it involves a breach of "duty to society and fellow
man."
15
Even if no one is injured, a drunk driver's actions arguably involve
a breach of a societal duty. If, in deciding whether a crime involves
moral turpitude, the court focuses on whether there is a breach of duty
to society, then driving under the influence should certainly fall within
this category. Drunk drivers cause thousands of deaths and injuries each
8. Id. at 241-42, 407 S.E.2d at 652-53 (citing State v. Drakeford, 290 S.C. 338,
350 S.E.2d 391 (1986) (holding that manufacturing of marijuana is a crime of moral
turpitude); State v. Lilly, 278 S.C. 499, 299 S.E.2d 329 (1983) (holding that
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is a crime of moral turpitude)).
9. See, e.g., Muniz v. State, 575 S.W.2d 408, 413 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979); In re
Higbie, 493 P.2d 97, 103 (Cal. 1972) (per curiam) (en banc).
10. In re McAllister, 95 P.2d 932, 933 (Cal. 1939) (en banc), limited by In re
Mostman, 765 P.2d 448, 455 (Cal. 1989) (en banc); see also In re Anderson, 195
N.W.2d 345, 349 (N.D. 1972). Examples of other crimes of moral turpitude include
conspiracy to distribute cocaine, e.g., In re Gorman, 379 N.E.2d 970, 971-72 (Ind.
1978) (per curiam), and conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States, e.g.,
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Bensabat, 378 So. 2d 380, 382 (La. 1979).
11. See e.g., Exparte McIntosh, 443 So. 2d 1283, 1286 (Ala. 1983); Luker v.
State, 361 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978); Higbie, 493 P.2d at 103.
12. See, e.g., McIntosh, 443 So. 2d at 1286; People v. Standard, 226 Cal. Rptr.
62, 64 (Ct. App. 1986); In re Campbell, 572 A.2d 1059, 1059 (D.C. 1990); Florida
Bar v. Sheppard, 518 So. 2d 250, 250 (Fla. 1988).
13. 411 S.E.2d 441 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
14. Id. at 442.
15. Green, 305 S.C. at 241, 407 S.E.2d at 252; see supra notes 6-7 and
accompanying text.
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year; surely these deaths and injuries represent a breach of a societal
duty.
The Hall decision is also inconsistent with the supreme court's
holding in State v. Major'6 that possession of cocaine for personal use
is a crime of moral turpitude. The Major court based its holding on the
addictivenature of cocaine and the devastating effect that it has had on
families and society as a whole.' 7 Arguably, alcohol has had this same
effect.
The South Carolina courts have apparently based their determination
of whether a particular drug-related crime involves moral turpitude on
the general societal acceptance of that drug.
Steven M. Pruitt
II. SUPREME COURT PROMULGATES REQUIREMENTS FOR
PROSPECTIVE COURT'S WITNESS
In State v. Anderson'8 the South Carolina Supreme Court set forth
the requirements that must be satisfied before a court can call its own
witness.' 9 The court established these guidelines to protect defendants
from the prejudicial impact that court's witnesses often create. 20 The
Anderson holding should help trial judges to make informed decisions
about the admissibility of court's witnesses and should prevent the use of
impeachment for improper purposes.2'
In 1980 Tony Anderson, his brother Donald Anderson, the victim's
girlfriend Barbara Nesbitt, and others were charged with the murder of
Nathaniel Reed. Donald Anderson pleaded guilty to noncapital murder
and testified at Nesbitt's trial that she had hired him to commit the
murder, but that his brother actually killed Reed. Tony Anderson was not
captured until 1987, when he was arrested in New York for an unrelated
offense. He was finally tried in 1988 for the murder of Reed. On motion
by the prosecution and outside of the presence of the jury, the trial judge
16. 301 S.C. 181, 391 S.E.2d 235 (1990).
17. Id. at 183, 391 S.E.2d at 237.
18. 304 S.C. 551, 406 S.E.2d 152 (1991).
19. Id. at 554-55, 406 S.E.2d at 153-54. These requirements are discussed infra
text accompanying notes 27-28.
20. See Anderson, 304 S.C. at 554, 406 S.E.2d at 153.
21. See generally Don Johnsen, Note, Impeachment with an Unsworn Prior
Inconsistent Statement as Subterfuge, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 295 (1987)
(addressing the approach of the federal courts to using impeachment as a subterfuge
to present otherwise inadmissible evidence to a jury).
[Vol. 44
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determined that Donald Anderson should be called as a court's witness
in his brother's trial. Tony Anderson was subsequently convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment.22
On appeal, Tony Anderson contended that the trial judge abused his
discretion by calling Donald Anderson as a court's witness because doing
so allowed the prosecution to avoid the "vouch" rule. Under the vouch
rule an offering party generally cannot cross-examine or impeach his own
witness unless the witness is hostile and the offering party first shows
surprise and harm.' As the court noted, "[t]he decision to call a court's
witness is generally within the discretion of the trial court."'24
The Anderson court recognized the potential prejudice of using a
court's witness at trial to avoid the vouch rule. 5 Accordingly, the court
established four prerequisites to protect defendants from jury prejudice
caused by evidence admitted through a court witness:
(1) The prosecution must be unwilling to vouch for the veracity or
integrity of the witness;
(2) a close relationship must exist between the accused and the
potential court's witness, i.e. accomplices, family members, etc.;
(3) there must be evidence that the prospective witness was an
eyewitness to the transaction upon which the prosecution is based,
gave a sworn statement concerning pertinent facts and the statement
has been contradicted or it is probable that it will be contradicted;
and
(4) the testimony the witness is to relate must be material, such that
without the testimony a miscarriage of justice would likely result.2 6
The court also established that a trial judge must hold a hearing outside
the jury's presence to consider whether a court's witness should be
called.27 Applying these guidelines, the supreme court found no abuse
22. Anderson, 304 S.C. at 553, 406 S.E.2d at 153.
23. Id. at 554 n.1, 406 S.E.2d at 153 n.1 (citing State v. Hamlet, 294 S.C. 77,
362 S.E.2d 644 (1987); State v. Bendoly, 273 S.C. 47, 254 S.E.2d 287 (1979)).
24. Id. at 554, 406 S.E.2d at 153 (citing State v. Tillman, 255 S.C. 528, 180
S.E.2d 209 (1971); Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores, 231 S.C. 565, 99 S.E.2d 384
(1957)).
25. Id. (quoting KENNETH S. BROWN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 8,
at 16 (3d ed. 1984)).
26. Id. at 554-55, 406 S.E.2d at 153-54 (citing Scarborough v. State, 437 A.2d
672, 676 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)).
27. Id. at 555, 406 S.E.2d at 154.
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of discretion in the instant case because all the prerequisites for calling
a court's witness had been met.'
The requirements established in Anderson for a prospective court's
witness are a necessary and logical addition to South Carolina evidence
law. Ordinarily in South Carolina, prior inconsistent statements may be
used as substantive evidence only "when the declarant testifies at trial
and is subject to cross examination."29 The vouch rule tempers this
exception to the hearsay rule by preventing an offering party from
impeaching his own witness.30 However, because both sides are allowed
to impeach a court's witness, the concern of improper prejudice to jurors
arises when a court's witness testifies.3' The rule established by the
Anderson court will allow important witnesses to testify, but will limit
the possibility that impeachment will be used to present unreliable
evidence.
Unlike South Carolina courts, the federal courts allow fairly
extensive impeachment. Rule 607 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
allows any party to impeach a witness.32 The advisory committee for
the federal rules rejected the traditional notion of the vouch rule:
A party does not hold out his witnesses as worthy of belief, since he
rarely has a free choice in selecting them. Denial of the right leaves
the party at the mercy of the witness and the adversary. . . . The
substantial inroads into the old rule made over the years by deci-
sions, rules, and statutes are evidence of doubts as to its basic
soundness and workability.33
Although the federal rules apparently allow more proper impeachment
then the vouch rule, federal courts are also faced with a prosecutor's
ability to impeach a witness with an otherwise inadmissible prior
inconsistent statement.34 "A crafty attorney may do this in hopes that
the jury will ignore the judge's limiting instructions which admitted these
28. Id.
29. State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572, 581, 300 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1103, and cert. denied, 463 U.S. 12!4 (1983).
30. See supra text accompanying note 23.
31. Anderson, 304 S.C. at 555, 406 S.E.2d at 154 (citing 81 Am. JUR. 2D
Witnesses § 3 (1976)).
32. FED. R. EVID. 607.
33. FED. R. EVID. 607 advisory committee's note.
34. See FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(A) (requiring that a prior inconsistent statement
be given under oath in order to qualify as non-hearsay).
[Vol. 44
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statements for credibility purposes only and not as substantive evi-
dence. "
In South Carolina the vouch rule generally continues to prevent a
party from using impeachment to present otherwise inadmissible hearsay
evidence before a jury." If the prosecutor is not allowed to impeach his
own witness without showing surprise and harm, little opportunity exists
for using impeachment as a subterfuge. 37 The new Anderson rule should
allow judges flexibility to help discover the truth at trial while protecting
the rights of the accused. However, a change in South Carolina's
adherence to the vouch rule would raise questions about the scope of
these new requirements.
Steven E. Williford
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY ABOUT EYEWITNESS RELIABILITY HELD
ADMISSIBLE
In State v. Whaley3s the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness identifications need
not meet the Jones test for the admissibility of scientific evidence.39 In
addition, the court specifically declared that a trial court's refusal to
admit such expert testimony would constitute reversible error40 if: (1)
the eyewitness suffers from a mental or physical disability that could
impair his perception or reliability;4' or (2) the identity of the perpetra-
35. Colleen G. Treml, State v. Hunt: Rekindling Requirements for Impeaching
One's Own Witness, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1236, 1236 (1990).
36. See Johnsen, supra note 21, at 331.
37. Id. at 298 n.6.
38. 305 S.C. 138, 406 S.E.2d 369 (1991).
39. Id. at 142, 406 S.E.2d at 372. The Jones test refers to State v. Jones, 273
S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979), in which the court held that the admissibility of
scientific evidence depends upon "'the degree to which the trier of fact must accept,
on faith, scientific hypotheses not capable of proof or disproof in court and not even
generally accepted outside the courtroom.'" Jones, 273 S.C. at 731, 259 S.E.2d at
124 (quoting People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355-56 (Ct. App. 1975)); cf. State
v. Ford, 301 S.C. 485, 392 S.E.2d 781 (1990) (admissibility of DNA evidence).
The Jones test is less restrictive than the familiar test for admissibility of scientific
evidence of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (requiring that
scientific evidence be generally accepted by the scientific community).
40. Generally, admission of expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Whaley, 305 S.C. at 143, 406 S.E.2d at 372 (citing State v. Jones, 273
S.C. 723, 259 S.E.2d 120 (1979)).
41. Id. (citing Jones v. State, 208 S.E.2d 850 (Ga. 1974)).
1992]
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 1 [], Art. 12
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss1/12
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tor is the main issue, the only evidence of the perpetrator's identity is
eyewitness identification, and the reliability of the identification is not
substantially supported by other independent evidence.42 Because
Whaley is the supreme court's first consideration of the admissibility of
expert testimony regarding eyewitness reliability, it is uncertain whether
a trial court's failure to admit this kind of testimony under different
circumstances would constitute an abuse of discretion.
In Whaley the defendant, a black male, allegedly attacked a white
female at her place of employment. Although the victim stared at the
assailant throughout the encounter, a black cloth covered the lower part
of the assailant's face the entire time. The victim's co-worker, a white
male, entered the premises during the attack and obtained a clear view
of the assailant's face during a brief confrontation with the fleeing
assailant. Both the victim and the witness assisted the police in develop-
ing a composite drawing of the suspect and separately identified the
defendant in a photographic lineup.43
At trial the defendant sought to introduce expert testimony from a
qualified psychologist that eyewitness identifications, particularly those
by white victims of black defendants, are unreliable.44 The State
objected to this testimony on the grounds that the psychologist was not
an acknowledged expert within the scientific community, and that the
field of eyewitness reliability was not a recognized area of expertise
under the Jones test.4' The trial judge sustained the objection, 6 and
42. Id. (citing People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984)). Notably, the
supreme court cautioned that an expert could not express an opinion about the
reliability of a particular witness's identification. Id. A trial court should exclude
expert testimony that gives a direct opinion on a matter that is an ultimate issue of
fact to be decided by the jury. See State v. Koon, 278 S.C. 528, 537, 298 S.E.2d
769, 774 (1982), overruled on other grounds by South Carolina v. Skipper, 476 U.S.
1 (1986). But see S.C. R. CalM. P. 24(c) ("Testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.").
43. Whaley, 305 S.C. at 140-41, 406 S.E.2d at 371.
44. Id. at 141, 406 S.E.2d at 371. During the proffer of testimony, the expert
witness, who had been qualified as an expert in over fifty trials, testified that there
are three stages of eyewitness identification: the acquisition stage (comprehension of
the situation), the retention or memory stage, and the recall stage. He noted that fear,
stress, fatigue, presence of weapons, lighting, exposure time, lapse in time between
incident and identification, race, existence of a composite drawing, and the
organization and content of a photographic lineup all can affect the reliability of an
eyewitness identification. Id.
45. Id. at 142, 406 S.E.2d at 371.
[Vol. 44
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the jury subsequently convicted Whaley of second-degree burglary,
armed robbery, and assault with intent to commit criminal sexual
conduct.47 The defendant appealed, alleging that the trial judge erred in
refusing to admit the expert testimony.4"
In reversing the trial court, the supreme court reasoned that
testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness identification is not the
type of scientific evidence considered in Jones.49 Instead, the court
likened such testimony to expert testimony given by doctors and
psychiatrists." If the witness is a qualified expert who merely explains
how internal and external factors affecting human perception and memory
influence the accuracy of an identification, then no additional foundation
is necessary to admit the testimony. 51
Although the Whaley court specifically defined two situations in
which a trial court's failure to admit expert testimony about eyewitness
reliability would be an abuse of discretion,52 the Whaley opinion does
not address whether excluding this kind of testimony in other situations
would be reversible error. The court noted that "other factors" also
favored admission of the expert's testimony in the instant case. 53
Therefore, it is uncertain whether the existence of these, or similar
46. Id. Although Dr. Cole was sufficiently qualified to testify as an expert, the
trial judge noted that the juries of South Carolina were not ready to receive testimony
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications. Id.
47. Id. at 140, 406 S.E.2d at 370.
48. Id.
49. Id. The Jones test is discussed supra note 39.
50. Whaley, 305 S.C. at 142, 406 S.E.2d at 371. The supreme court noted that
"'scientific' evidence" refers to such items as "DNA test results, blood spatter
interpretation, and bite mark comparisons." Id.
51. Id. at 142, 406 S.E.2d at 371-72 (citing People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709
(Cal. 1984)). In accord with the McDonald court, the Whaley court adopted a
standard less restrictive than Jones for the admission of eyewitness reliability
evidence. See supra note 39. The McDonald court noted that the scientific evidence
rule is invoked in cases concerning "novel devices or processes such as lie detectors,
. . . Naline testing, experimental systems of blood typing, . . . and hypnosis."
McDonald, 690 P.2d at 724. Because expert eyewitness reliability testimony does not
concern devices or processes, such as those described in McDonald, that are
incapable of being proved or disproved in court, neither the Jones nor the Frye test
is applicable. Rather, the jury is capable of receiving the testimony and reaching its
own conclusions.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 41 and 42.
53. Whaley, 305 S.C. at 143, 406 S.E.2d at 372. The court noted three factors:
the partial obfuscation of the assailant's face during the attack on the victim, the
cross-racial nature of the identification, and the short length of time each witness was
exposed to the perpetrator. Id.
1992]
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factors, beyond the two situations delineated by the court, would warrant
admission of such expert testimony. The court implied, however, that
trial courts generally should admit this kind of testimony.
Several other jurisdictions have examined the admissibility of expert
testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications.
Generally, courts have based their analyses on the following issues: (1)
whether such testimony is within the common knowledge of the jury; 4
(2) whether such testimony invades the province of the jury to decide an
ultimate fact in issue;"s and (3) whether the accuracy of an eyewitness
identification is more properly handled by cross-examination of the
eyewitness.56 However, reliance on these factors to exclude such
testimony is unfounded and mischaracterizes the nature of this testimony.
Accordingly, South Carolina appellate courts should not rely on these
factors in considering whether a trial court's refusal to admit expert
testimony about eyewitness identification constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
First of all, eyewitness reliability is not necessarily within the
common knowledge of the jury. Generally, expert testimony is admissi-
ble if the testimony is about matter not within the common knowledge or
experience of the jury, and if the testimony gives guidance and assistance
to the jury in determining a factual issue. 7 Although some jurisdictions
have held that the various factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness
testimony are within the common knowledge of the jury, 5 most jurors
do not fully understand all of the factors that affect eyewitness identifica-
tions.5 9 Consequently, it is difficult to see how a trial court could
conclude that information from an expert on eyewitness reliability is both
within the common understanding of, and not helpful to, an average
juror.
54. See cases cited infra note 58 and accompanying text.
55. See cases cited infra note 60 and accompanying text.
56. See cases cited infra note 63 and accompanying text.
57. See FED. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert. . . may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion.. . ."). South Carolina adopted FED. R. EVID. 702 as S.C. R. CIV. P.
43(1) and S.C. R. CRiM. P. 24(a), effective July 1, 1990. WALTER A. REISER, JR.,
A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH SOUTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE LAW 52 (4th ed. 1990).
58. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 208 S.E.2d 850, 853 (Ga. 1974); People v. Gibbs,
550 N.Y.S.2d 400, 400 (App. Div. 1990); State v. Buell, 489 N.E.2d 795, 802
(Ohio), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871 (1985); State v. Hill, 463 N.W.2d 674, 677 (S.D.
1990); State v. Bell, 788 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Wash. Ct. App: 1990).
59. See People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 720 (Cal. 1984).
[Vol. 44
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Another common argument for excluding expert testimony regarding
eyewitness reliability is that such testimony invades the province of the
jury to judge the credibility of the eyewitness.' South Carolina follows
the generally accepted principle that expert witnesses may not give an
opinion on the credibility of a witness.61 However, in simply relaying
to the jury a list of the various factors that may affect perception and
memory, the expert does not express an opinion about the truthfulness of
a particular eyewitness. 62 The jury may apply the expert's testimony to
the facts of the case and come to its own conclusion as to the eyewit-
ness's credibility.
Finally, numerous jurisdictions have held that the proper way to
assess the credibility and accuracy of an eyewitness's identification is
through cross-examination of the eyewitness.63 However, this argument
incorrectly assumes that both the jury and the examining counsel
understand how the various internal and external factors affect the
identification. If a jury has no basis of knowledge from which to judge
an eyewitness's responses, whether the eyewitness's testimony during
cross-examination would aid the jury in determining the accuracy of the
identification is questionable. Therefore, the use of cross-examination is
no substitute for the expert's testimony.
The supreme court in State v. Whaley opened the door for the
admission of expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness
identification by declaring that such testimony need not meet the
requirements of the Jones test. The court held that the admission of
expert testimony should remain within the sound discretion of the trial
court, but recognized two instances in which failure to admit this kind of
eyewitness testimony would constitute an abuse of that discretion.
Unfortunately, the court did not go far enough. Such testimony is beyond
the common knowledge and experience of the jury, does not invade the
province of the jury to determine the credibility of the eyewitness, and
cannot be effectively elicited through cross-examination of the eyewit-
ness; therefore, courts should admit this type of testimony in cases that
involve an eyewitness identification when the record shows that the
accuracy of the identification is questionable.
Simpson Zimmerman Fant
60. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 208 S.E.2d 850, 853 (Ga. 1974); Cox v. State, 398
S.E.2d 262, 264 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Miller, 565 N.E.2d 840, 847 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1988); State v. Hill, 463 N.W.2d 674, 677 (S.D. 1990).
61. See Bailey v. MacDougall, 251 S.C. 290, 162 S.E.2d 177 (1968).
62. See McDonald, 690 P.2d at 722; see also FED. R. EVID. 608.
63. See, e.g., United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973);
19921
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